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THE COLLAPSE OF FINANCIAL FRAUD: 
MEASURING BANKRUPTCY AVOIDANCE 
ACTIONS 
JESSICA D. GABEL,* ISAAC ASHER** & MARY BETH BYINGTON*** 
I.  A DEFINITION OF PONZI SCHEMES 
Ponzi schemes lay their foundation on fraud.  Once the con is 
exposed, the culprits are usually stripped of their pilfered millions and 
sent off to jail.  Unfortunately for the victims, the process of recovering 
any portion of the money they lost in the scam is, to put it mildly, 
complicated.  The challenge rests, in part, in differences between federal 
forfeiture statutes and Bankruptcy Code principles in determining what 
assets can be recovered and who is entitled to a portion of the Ponzi pie.  
What is a Ponzi scheme (as defined by the courts rather than the media)?  
The Second Circuit defines a Ponzi scheme as a “fraudulent investment 
scheme in which money contributed by later investors is used to pay 
artificially high dividends to the original investors, creating an illusion of 
profitability, thus attracting new investors.”1  The Ninth Circuit has 
embraced an arguably broader description: “any sort of fraudulent 
arrangement that uses later acquired funds or products to pay off 
previous investors.”2  Other courts add that the scheme did not “conduct 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. 
** J.D. Candidate 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. 
*** J.D. Candidate 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1 Ades-Berg Investors v. Breeden (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 439 F.3d 155, 157 
n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 2 Canning v. Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis added). 
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legitimate business as represented to investors.”3  In essence, a Ponzi 
scheme is a “money in, money out” con game.4 
After the scheme collapses, as it inevitably does, Ponzi investors fall 
into two broad categories.  The first is the “net losers” – investors who 
failed to receive a full return, or in many cases any return, on their 
principal investment,5 because their contributions were used to satisfy 
other investors’ expectations. 
The other broad category is “net winners” – “lucky” investors who 
received redemption payments that exceed the value of their principal 
investments.6  Recoupment of fictitious profits may subject the net 
winners to disgorgement of those profits and, in some instances, even 
disgorgement of principal (although this largely applies only to net 
winners).7 
Beyond these broad categories, there often are “feeder funds” – 
various hedge funds, brokerage houses, and banks that steered large 
pools of investors into the Ponzi scheme.8  Relationships with feeder 
funds enable the Ponzi schemer to sustain the scam over a longer period 
of time by sweeping in thousands of smaller investors.9 
These victims may find two areas of law interacting to determine 
recovery and distribution of the Ponzi scheme assets. 
II.  PONZI SCHEMES UNDER FORFEITURE LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW 
There are marked differences between forfeiture law and 
bankruptcy law, as applied to Ponzi schemes.  Forfeiture provisions, 
found throughout both the federal civil and criminal codes, govern 
 3 See Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 4 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06–62966–PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, at *9 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009). 
 5 In re Smith, 132 B.R. 73, 74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See generally Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and 
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998) (providing a general overview of Ponzi 
schemes). 
 8 Nick S. Dhesi, The Conman and The Sheriff: SEC Jurisdiction and the Role of Offshore 
Financial Centers in Modern Securities Fraud, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1366 (2010). 
 9 Id.  Various groups, including individual investors, state regulators, federal agencies, and 
bankruptcy trustees, may often target lawsuits and investigations at the feeder funds that invested 
customers’ cash into Ponzi schemes.  Lawrence J. Zweifach & Sophia N. Khan, Recent 
Developments in Ponzi Scheme Litigation, 1844 PLI/Corp 99, 101 (2010).  Such actions carry 
varying degrees of success against financial firms, as most cases turn on the question of what the 
investment house either knew or should have known about the legitimacy of the investment 
opportunity.  Id. 
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seizure and distribution of property in response to wrongdoing.10  
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code contains statutory guidelines for when 
and how assets become a part of the bankruptcy estate and how those 
assets should be distributed.  Both areas of law have their benefits, and 
their shortcomings. 
A.  FORFEITURE11 
“Forfeiture” is defined12 as the divestiture of property without 
compensation and the loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a 
crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty.13  Forfeiture has three 
goals: punishment, deterrence, and restitution.14  In essence, forfeiture 
both forces a criminal defendant to disgorge ill-gotten profits15 and 
assures that the property is not used for illegal means.16  For some 
crimes, Congress has not granted any forfeiture authority at all.  For 
others, law enforcement can confiscate only the proceeds of the offense 
itself,17 or only the instrumentalities used to commit the offense.18 
Traditional forfeiture law, which serves as the foundation for 
modern civil forfeiture, dates from ancient times,19 and makes the res the 
principal focus of the action.20  Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding 
 10 DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS, Ch. §11:3. Governing Statutes (August 2011). 
 11 There are three basic types of forfeiture: criminal, civil, and administrative.  For a more 
detailed explanation of criminal forfeiture, see Sarah N. Welling & Jane Lyle Hord, Friction in 
Reconciling Criminal Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The Criminal Forfeiture Part, 42 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 551 (2012). 
 12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (8th ed. 2004). 
 13 Armstrong v. Keene, 861 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
 14 See infra Appendix A.I. 
 15 United States v. Hoover-Hankerson, 511 F.3d 164, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 16 State of Kansas I-135/I-70 Drug Task Force v. 1990 Lincoln Town Car, Vin No. 
1LNLM82F1LY694880, 145 P.3d 921, 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 17 Proceeds of an offense comprise any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, that 
the wrongdoer would not have obtained or retained, but for the crime.  Appellate Brief, United States 
v. Razmilovic, Nos. 04-4543-cr(L), 04-5081-cr(CON) (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2004), 2004 WL 3589671 at 
*48. 
 18 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012). 
 19 Asset forfeiture can be traced to Exodus 21:28: “If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they 
die: then the ox shall surely be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall 
be quit.”  In the Middle Ages and the law of deodand, it was stated: “[W]here a man killeth another 
with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is on the 
owner.”  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5 (1998) (citing 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 420-424 (1st Am. Ed 1847); 1 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England). 
 20 United States v. Twelve Thousand, Three Hundred Ninety Dollars ($12,390.00), 956 F.2d 
801, 803 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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against the seized property itself,21 designed primarily to confiscate 
property used in violation of law, and to require disgorgement of the 
fruits of illegal conduct.22  The roots of the modern criminal forfeiture 
system, in comparison, arose out of the RICO statutes and the federal 
drug laws.23  Modern criminal forfeiture functions as an in personam 
proceeding against the party who committed the criminal acts.24 
Civil and criminal forfeitures are usually accomplished in a four-
step process: seizure, notice, forfeiture proceedings, and recovery.25  To 
seize the asset, the government must show probable cause to believe that 
the object was used in criminal activity.26  The burden then shifts to the 
citizen to show that the property should not be subject to forfeiture.27  
Once forfeiture is declared, the government’s title relates back in time to 
the commission of the criminal act.28  Nevertheless, the statutory 
schemes for both civil and criminal forfeiture allow innocent owners29 to 
challenge a forfeiture action, if they have standing.30  While restitution is 
 21 United States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 22 Belk v. Cheshire, 583 S.E.2d 700, 704 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 23 Modern criminal forfeiture is rooted in: 1) the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (Westlaw 
2012), which was enacted to combat organized crime; and 2) the federal drug laws, 21 U.S.C.A. § 
853 (Westlaw 2012), which mandate forfeiture of any property derived from or involved in a federal 
narcotics offense. 
 24 Fleet, 498 F.3d at 1231. 
 25 See infra Appendix A.II. 
 26 See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 1012 Germantown Rd., Palm Beach 
County, Fla., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that 19 U.S.C. § 1615 gives the trial 
court responsibility for determining whether the government has proven probable cause (to prove 
probable cause, the government must convince the judge that it had a “reasonable ground for belief 
of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than a reasonable suspicion”) and then § 
1615 shifts the burden to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a defense to the 
forfeiture). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (Westlaw 2012) (codifying the relation back doctrine); see also 
In re Thena, Inc., 190 B.R. 407, 411 (D. Or. 1995) (stating that “upon the defendant’s conviction . . . 
the United States’ rights in the forfeited property are deemed to relate back to the time the predicate 
criminal acts were committed.  Until conviction . . . the United States’ rights in the subject property 
are not vested even though the forfeiture statute may give the United States pre-conviction or even 
pre-indictment possessory rights over the property.”); United States v. Trotter, 912 F.2d 964, 965-66 
(8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the purpose of the provision is to prevent people from trying to avoid 
forfeiture actions through pre-conviction transfers of property that are not “arms-length”); 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (Westlaw 2012). 
 29 See United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d 200, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that “if a 
third party can demonstrate that his interest in the forfeited property is exclusive of or superior to the 
interest of the defendant, the third party’s claim renders that portion of the order of forfeiture 
reaching his interest invalid.”).  Note that the “innocent owner” doctrine applies to both criminal and 
civil forfeiture. 
 30 See United States v. Starcevic, 766 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939-40 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (noting that 
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) provides that “any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss4/7
2012] Measuring Bankruptcy Avoidance Actions 591 
 
 
a goal of forfeiture, the United States Attorney General has discretion 
with respect to using the forfeited funds to compensate victims.  This 
process is called remission or mitigation.31  Remission can mimic 
distribution in bankruptcy, but it lacks the detailed statutory distribution 
constructs developed under the Bankruptcy Code.32 
B.  BANKRUPTCY 
As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code establishes a systematic order 
of distribution of assets in bankruptcy cases.  It also establishes a 
comprehensive scheme for gathering property, including property that 
may have left the debtor’s possession prior to the bankruptcy case, either 
in legitimate or fraudulent payment of creditors or others.  Both of these 
components serve the bankruptcy law goal of preventing the unjust 
enrichment of creditors who “run to the court.”  They serve instead to 
distribute assets in a fair and equitable way.  Tension can arise, however, 
if anticipated distribution of assets under bankruptcy principles differs 
from proposed distribution under forfeiture and remission principles, 
particularly if the identified “victims” of fraud are different than the 
identified “creditors” in the bankruptcy case, or are given different 
priority of payment than they would receive in a bankruptcy case.33 
Whether under forfeiture law or bankruptcy law, Ponzi scheme 
claimants are not generally seeking payment on a mere invoice for a 
delivery made six months before bankruptcy.  Ponzi investors share one 
common attribute: they are all victims of an elaborate con.  But any 
collective identity ends there.  Rather, the claimants in a Ponzi scheme 
have varying degrees of interests and liabilities.  Ultimately, the timing 
and amounts of withdrawal from the scheme separate the winners from 
the losers. 
in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States . . . may . . . petition the court for a 
hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property,” and that “to prevail in a § 
853(n) claim, a petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is 
either a bona fide purchaser for value or that the petitioner possesses a right, title, or interest in the 
seized property that is superior to the defendant’s right, title, or interest in the property.”); see also 
Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d at 208 (stating that “a ‘bona fide purchaser for value’ must be construed 
liberally to include all persons who give value to the defendant in an arms’-length transaction with 
the expectation that they would receive equivalent value in return.  If such persons are without 
knowledge of the potential forfeitability of the defendant’s assets, they are entitled to recover under 
§ 853(n)(6)(B).”). 
 31 Id. 
 32 11 U.S.C.A. § 726 (Westlaw 2012). 
 33 Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Handling Claims in Ponzi Scheme Bankruptcy and Receivership 
Cases, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (2012). 
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In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,34 the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that a core tenet of the Bankruptcy Code is a 
debtor’s privilege to avoid fraudulent and preferential transfers.35  The 
Bankruptcy Code provides a trustee (or a debtor in possession)36 with 
these two crucial statutory tools that enable the trustee to claw funds 
back from creditors (or, investors in Ponzi schemes) who received 
disbursements prior to the bankruptcy.37  Trustees can seek the return of 
transfers through either (1) preference claims that allow the trustee to 
avoid transfers made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing (Bankruptcy 
Code section 547), or (2) fraudulent transfer claims that allow the trustee 
to avoid transfers more than 90 days before bankruptcy filing 
(Bankruptcy Code section 548).38  Essentially, fraudulent transfers 
diminish assets of the estate without a corresponding reduction in debt or 
obligation; preferential transfers, which are the younger form of creditor 
protection, deplete assets of the estate but also reduce an obligation 
owing to a creditor. 
 34 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 35 Id. at 371-72. 
 36 In bankruptcy cases, the power to recover property for the estate is vested in either the 
trustee or, in chapter 11 cases, the debtor in possession.  In chapter 11 business bankruptcies, the 
debtor company is referred to the debtor in possession as it attempts to reorganize its debts.  11 
U.S.C.A. § 1101(1) (Westlaw 2012).  Consequently, the debtor in possession (as represented by 
counsel) may initiate an avoidance action.  The debtor in possession is not omnipotent, however.  If 
the debtor in possession exhibits “fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross management,” a trustee 
may be appointed to replace the debtor in possession.  11 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).  
The trustee then may pursue any avoidance actions that the debtor in possession would have the right 
to.  While most bankruptcy Ponzi schemes are ultimately chapter 7 liquidations because there is no 
legitimate business to salvage, some do begin in chapter 11.  In those cases, an appointment of a 
trustee is immediate and necessary given the nature of business.  Paul W. Bonapfel, John Mills & 
Todd Neilson, The Business Bankruptcy Panel: Ponzi Schemes—Bankruptcy Court v. Federal Court 
Equity Receivership, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 207 (2010).  Some practitioners and judges believe 
that Ponzi schemes should never be chapter 11 cases because there typically is little to nothing to 
reorganize.  Id. (comments by Bonapfel, J.). 
 37 Some Ponzi schemes fall first into a receivership and may remain there or transition into 
bankruptcy.  Appointed receivers can successfully pursue claw backs of fraudulent transfers under 
state law.  The drawback, however, is that receivers do not hold the bevy of powers a bankruptcy 
trustee does under the Bankruptcy Code.  If a statutory or common law receivership of the enterprise 
is not in the best interests of the creditors or the estate, the receiver could initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings—such as happened in the Madoff and Petters cases.  See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. (In re Bernard L. Madoff), No. 09-11893 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 
9, 2009), available at www.madoff.com/document/other/252_order.pdf. 
 38 See infra Appendix B.I. 
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1.  Preferences: Timing is Everything 
In business situations, many creditors will experience bankruptcy 
through the preference lens.39  A preference is a payment made on the 
“eve” of bankruptcy to a creditor in order to extinguish or reduce a pre-
existing debt.40  The term derives from the legal presumption that, by 
paying a specific creditor, an insolvent debtor has preferred that creditor 
to the detriment of the larger pool of creditors41 because the payee will 
receive a greater percentage of its claim than it would have under a pro 
rata general distribution together with the other creditors.42  Often, 
trustees would much rather prosecute preference claims in cases of 
financial fraud because there is no good faith defense and the transfers 
fall outside the realm of “ordinary course of business.”  Unfortunately, 
the 90-day window on preferences is a short one, and often more than 90 
days pass between the last transfers and the filing of the bankruptcy.43  
Preferences are voidable transactions, meaning that the trustee can decide 
whether to bring an avoidance action and that the creditor can raise a 
variety of defenses.44  Authorizing the trustee to avoid transfers made 
within a short period before bankruptcy discourages creditors from 
sprinting to the courthouse to “dismember the debtor during his slide into 
bankruptcy.”45  Preference recovery also levels the playing field among 
creditors by providing for more equitable distribution of the debtor’s 
 39 Some companies may also face fraudulent transfer actions, but the average trade creditor 
for a debtor in bankruptcy usually finds itself on the defending end of a preference action.  See Cent. 
Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 371-72 (2006) (describing such a dynamic). 
 40 Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443 (1917) (“Preference implies paying or securing a pre-
existing debt of the person preferred” on the eve of bankruptcy); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 
1288 (9th Cir. 1969) (describing a preference as one that is made within four months of bankruptcy, 
discussing prior law). 
 41 Mosier v. Ever-Fresh Food Co. (In re IRFM, Inc.), 52 F.3d 228, 232 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that one of the underlying policies of a preference action is to prevent “a debtor from 
benefitting a particular creditor on the eve of bankruptcy”). 
 42 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160 (1991). 
 43 See, e.g., Daly v. Simeone (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 270 B.R. 325, 329 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 2001) (finding that trustee established all elements of a preferential transfer); see generally 
Jobin v. Matthews (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 184 B.R. 136, 139 (D. Colo. 1995) (discussing the 
policies served by preference law). 
 44 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (Westlaw 2012) (enumerating the defenses to a trustee’s 
preference action); see also Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The 
bankruptcy trustee has the discretionary power to avoid and to recover preferential transfers.”); 
Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 338 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A creditor against whom a preference suit is sought has the burden of 
proving one of the defenses in § 547(c) by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 45 Id. at 161 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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assets.46  Thus, any creditor that received a greater percentage payment 
than other similarly situated creditors may be required to disgorge that 
payment so that the whole may share pro rata.47 
The trustee’s burden of proof in preference actions is lower than in 
fraudulent transfer actions because the Bankruptcy Code rebuttably 
presumes that any funds, whether principal or profit, paid (or withdrawn) 
within 90 days before the bankruptcy filing are an improper preference.48  
If the trustee satisfies the elements of a preference action, the burden 
shifts to the preferred investor to assert perhaps the only available 
affirmative defense in a Ponzi scheme: that the transaction occurred in 
the “ordinary course of business.”49  Moreover, the trustee may use 
section 547 to “recover both principal investments as well as fictitious 
profits earned despite any objective or subjective good-faith defense 
raised by the investor.”50  For those reasons, section 547 preference 
actions are often superior to fraudulent transfer actions. 
Section 547 does not grant a good faith defense to the transferee, 
and the section 550 good faith defense is not available to the initial 
transferee of a preferential transfer.51  In Ponzi scheme proceedings to 
recover preferences, perhaps the only viable defense is that the 
withdrawal occurred in the “ordinary course of business” under section 
547(c).  This defense serves two purposes.  First, it permits, and even 
encourages, creditors to engage in normal and customary business 
dealings with debtors on the brink of bankruptcy.52  Second, it 
discourages and rejects extraordinary debt collection actions or payment 
terms.53  This preference defense, however, loses its social utility in the 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (Westlaw 2012). 
 49 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (providing the elements of the ordinary 
course of business defense). 
 50 Jerry J. Campos, Avoiding the Discretionary Function Rule in the Madoff Case, 55 LOY. L. 
REV. 587, 600 (2009) (discussing recourse for defrauded investors of Ponzi schemes during 
bankruptcy proceedings). 
 51 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547, 550 (Westlaw 2012). 
 52 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 157 (1991) (stating that ordinary course of 
business defense insulates from preference attack payments made as part of a bank’s ordinary course 
of business). 
 53 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY: CHAPTER 5 BANKRUPTCY CODE, CREDITORS, DEBTORS, 
AND THE ESTATE § 547.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender Co., Inc. ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996) (noting 
Congress’s intent to discourage unusual action by creditors during a debtor’s slide into bankruptcy). 
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Ponzi scheme context because the very act of paying investors facilitates 
the fraud rather than a legitimate business.54 
The creditor must satisfy both prongs of the ordinary course 
defense.  First, the creditor / preference defendant must show that the 
debt arose in the ordinary course of business (e.g., an arm’s length 
transaction that does not depart from the traditional or historic dealings 
between the parties).55  Second, the creditor must establish that the 
payments were made in either: (a) the ordinary course of the parties’ 
particular business relationship (a subjective test), or (b) the ordinary 
course of the business or industry in which the debtor or creditor operate 
(an objective test).56 
Under this defense, payments made in the ordinary course of 
business or financial affairs of the debtor generally escape clawback 
under section 547.  Should this defense be applicable in a Ponzi scheme 
case where the ordinary course of the debtor’s business is fraud?57  To 
prevent net-winning Ponzi investors from using section 547(c)(2) to 
defeat the trustee’s preference actions, some courts have adopted a 
blanket rule that the ordinary course of business defense is simply 
unavailable to “any creditor being pursued by a trustee of a Ponzi 
scheme.”58 
Even though other courts are reluctant to adopt a wholesale ban on 
the defense, the net-winning investor typically fails regardless because 
 54 See Sender v. Nancy Elizabeth R. Heggland Family Trust (In re Hedge-Inv. Assocs., Inc.), 
48 F.3d 470, 476 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that payments to investor were not in “ordinary course of 
business” because they were made in an ongoing Ponzi scheme). 
 55 Id. 
 56 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (Westlaw 2012).  The industry norm requires an examination of 
the relevant industry.  The inquiry becomes whether the relevant industry is that of the debtor or 
creditor if they have merely a vendor/customer relationship.  Because the creditor must affirmatively 
assert the defense, one might argue that the appropriate industry to consider is that of the creditor.  
Nonetheless, a trustee might challenge this and focus the test on the debtor’s industry.  Even 
assuming that the parties agree, proving the relevant industry practices requires expert testimony.  
See Finley v. Mr. T’s Apparel (In re Wash. Mfg. Co.), 144 B.R. 376, 380 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992) 
(requiring expert testimony); see also Morris v. Kan. Drywall Supply Co. (In re Classic Drywall, 
Inc.), 121 B.R. 69, 78-79 (D. Kan. 1990) (finding that testimony of officer of preferred creditor 
alone was sufficient). 
 57 For consumer cases, “the paragraph uses the phrase ‘financial affairs’ to include such 
nonbusiness activities as payment of monthly utility bills.”  S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978). 
 58 Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential 
Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 185 (1998); see also Henderson v. Buchanan, 985 F.2d 1021, 
1025 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating the Ninth Circuit had previously held Ponzi schemes were not true 
businesses; thus any transfers related to such schemes cannot be deemed within the “ordinary course 
of business”); In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 991 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (internal citation omitted) 
(“Ponzi schemes are not legitimate businesses which Congress intended to protect by enactment of § 
547(c)(2).”). 
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the courts conclude that the “payments made to Ponzi investors cannot 
satisfy the requirement that payments must be ‘made according to 
ordinary business terms’ because ordinary businesses, among other 
things, do not pay fictitious profits.”59 
While preference law has a litany of other defenses available to the 
transferee, courts rarely, if ever, permit investors to take advantage of 
them in Ponzi scheme cases, even when it comes to return of principal.60  
This tacit policy falls short of a bright-line rule, but the result is 
consistent and predictable. 
In contrast, the facts so fatal to a preference defense—a Ponzi 
scheme’s fraudulent purpose and lack of legitimate business 
operations—are not necessarily fatal to fraudulent transfer action 
defenses.  Thus, that body of law remains ripe with uncertainty. 
2.  Fraudulent Transfers: Intent 
Asset depletion often takes the form of gratuitous transfers for little 
or no value on the eve of bankruptcy.  Regardless of a Ponzi investor’s 
status as a victim of the scheme (and any related recovery they might 
receive as a result of a forfeiture action), bankruptcy trustees routinely 
use section 548 to recover payments made to the investors and reallocate 
those recoveries to the larger universe of defrauded investors, which may 
or may not include those persons who the government considers to be 
victims.61 
For a fraudulent transfer claim to succeed in recovering assets that 
left the debtor’s estate prior to bankruptcy, under section 548, a 
bankruptcy trustee may proceed under a theory of either actual fraud62 or 
constructive fraud.63  The trustee must show either that the transferor’s 
 59 McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. at 185; see also Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1339-40 
(10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a bright-line rule that section 547(c)(2) should never apply in the context 
of Ponzi schemes, but holding that the payments were not in the ordinary course of business); 
Inskeep v. Grosso (In re Fin. Partners, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 629, 637-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding 
that Ponzi investors were not protected by ordinary course of business defense). 
 60 See, e.g., Grosso, 116 B.R. at 637-38 (holding that Ponzi investors were not protected by 
ordinary course of business defense). 
 61 See, e.g., Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 434 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1997) (applying section 548 to Ponzi investors). 
 62 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (providing for avoidance of transfer made 
with actual intent to defraud). 
 63 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(B) (Westlaw 2012) (providing for avoidance of transfer for 
less than reasonably equivalent value). 
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actual or imputed intent was to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors64 or 
that the transferor was under a certain kind of financial distress when she 
made the transfer and did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the 
transfer.65  As an equitable objective, the latter recognizes that any 
significant disparity between the value received and the value 
surrendered will significantly harm innocent creditors.”66  This approach 
considers the substance rather than the form of the transaction67 by 
recognizing that, even absent conspiratorial intent, paying a net-winner 
Ponzi investor will impair other investors because the “profit” 
represented by the payment was either imaginary or simply robbed from 
Peter to pay Paul.68 
In practice, the distinction between constructive and actual fraud 
seems insignificant.  Constructive fraud takes more legwork (i.e., 
discovery) to prove, but the result would seem to be the same in either 
case: the innocent investor must return funds.69 
The “actual fraud” theory requires that the trustee prove that the 
Ponzi operator (i.e., debtor) made the transfers to the investor “[w]ith 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” the creditors (i.e. the losing 
investors).70  Unlike the garden variety fraudulent transfer action where 
proving actual intent can be a time-intensive process, “[t]he mere 
existence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish actual intent” to 
defraud.71  Ponzi scheme operators often admit, sometimes in a plea 
 64 See, e.g., Bauman v. Bliese (In re McCarn’s Allstate Fin., Inc.), 326 B.R. 843, 848, 852 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that trustee successfully established debtor’s intent to defraud 
under section 548(a)(1)(A)). 
 65 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii)(II) (Westlaw 2012). 
 66 In re Dayton Title Agency, Inc., 292 B.R. 857, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 67 See, e.g., Cooper v. Centar Inv. Ltd. (In re TriGem Am. Corp.), 431 B.R. 855, 862 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2010) (reasoning that it was necessary to look at the entire substance of the transaction in 
evaluating whether earmarking doctrine applied to fraudulent transfer action). 
 68 In a Ponzi scheme, “[t]he fraud consists of funneling proceeds received from new investors 
to previous investors in the guise of profits from the alleged business venture, thereby cultivating an 
illusion that a legitimate profit-making business opportunity exists and inducing further investment.”  
Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 69 See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 483 n.3 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 2002) (discussing the two theories under which a trustee can pursue fraudulent transfers). 
 70 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2012). 
 71 Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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agreement, the “actual intent” element.72  Thus, a Ponzi scheme provides 
a presumptive element of actual fraud.73 
In contrast, the “constructive fraud” theory is a two-part analysis.  
First, it requires that the trustee demonstrate that the transfer (payment) 
to the investor occurred for less than “reasonably equivalent value” in 
exchange for the payment.74  Profits that the debtor disburses via 
collections from later investors cannot amount to a “reasonably 
equivalent” exchange for the winning investor’s principal investment.75  
The second part of “constructive fraud” requires that the trustee 
demonstrate that one of four financial events occurred: (1) the debtor was 
insolvent on the date of the payment or was rendered insolvent because 
of it, (2) the debtor was engaged or about to engage in business for which 
the assets remaining after the payment constituted “unreasonably small 
capital,” (3) the debtor intended to incur debts beyond its ability to pay 
them at maturity, or (4) the debtor made the transfer to or for the benefit 
of an insider under a separate agreement and not in the ordinary course 
of business.76 
The insolvency component of constructive fraud77 is somewhat 
straightforward as courts regularly hold Ponzi schemes to be insolvent 
from inception.78  Under this theory, recovery of distributions made to an 
investor in excess of the investment are generally recoverable.79  The 
constructive fraud theory may nevertheless insulate some or all of the net 
winner’s principal investment.  For payouts less than or equal to the 
amount of the creditor’s principal investment, courts often conclude that 
 72 See, e.g., Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 433 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 1997) (“[T]he criminal conviction of [the defendant] based on the debtors’ operation of a Ponzi 
scheme conclusively establishes fraudulent intent . . . .”). 
 73 See In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d at 704 (explaining that a Ponzi scheme by itself is 
enough to establish transfers were made with actual fraudulent intent). 
 74 Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), 440 B.R. 243, 261 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stone v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc. (In re Hennings Feed and Crop Care, Inc.), 365 
B.R. 868, 874 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007). 
 75 See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (Westlaw 2012) (providing for avoidance of 
transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value). 
 76 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV) (Westlaw 2012). 
 77 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (requiring that transferor was insolvent at time of 
transfer or became insolvent as a result). 
 78 See, e.g., Rieser v. Hayslip (In re Canyon Sys. Corp.), 343 B.R. 615, 650 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 2006) (“[G]iven the undisputed evidence that Canyon was operating a Ponzi scheme from the 
time it commenced operations, the Court may find as a matter of law that the Debtor intended to 
incur debts beyond its ability to repay.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou 
Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 843 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that each transfer of fictitious 
profits was for less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 
B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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the creditor gave reasonably equivalent value,80 such that the trustee may 
recover only the net profits paid to the investor under the constructive 
fraud theory, unless the trustee can establish that the investor lacked 
good faith.81 
Under section 548(c), a transferee may retain a transfer if the 
transferee (1) takes for value and (2) takes in good faith (typically limited 
to return of principal).  The defendant / transferee must prove both “good 
faith” and “value.”  In Bayou III, “value” was not at issue, but the court 
devoted considerable analysis to section 548(c)’s “good faith” prong.82  
The court observed that “good faith” is not defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code or in worthwhile legislative history.83  Instead, the court examined 
case law to define and apply “good faith.”84 
According to Bayou III, the “good faith” element of section 548(c) 
is determined by objective inquiry; a transferee’s subjective good faith is 
irrelevant.85  This objective perspective asks what the transferee 
objectively knew or should have known in deciding whether the 
transferee accepted a payment in good faith.86  Objective good faith does 
not exist if (i) the surrounding circumstances would place a reasonable 
person on inquiry notice of the debtor’s fraudulent objective, and (ii) 
diligent inquiry would have revealed the fraud.87  Under this approach, 
the Bayou III court embraces the Manhattan Fund test, which “requires 
either that: (1) the transferee was not on ‘inquiry notice’; or (2) if on 
notice, the transferee was ‘diligent in its investigation’ of the 
transferor.”88 
In determining what constitutes “inquiry notice,” an investor in a 
Ponzi scheme is presumed to be on inquiry notice if she “knew or should 
know of information” or a “red flag” placing her “objectively ‘on alert 
 80 Fisher v. Sellis (In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.), 253 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2000) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]o the extent of invested principal, payments from the debtor 
are deemed to be made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. . . . Payments in excess of 
amounts invested are considered fictitious profits because they do not represent a return on 
legitimate investment activity.”). 
 81 For an example of a court adopting this holding, see Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 771 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 82 In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 396 B.R. at 844. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (citing Bear Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund), 397 B.R. 1, 23 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 86 Id. at 845 (quoting Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In re Agric. Research and Tech. 
Grp., Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. (citing In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 22). 
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that there was a potential problem with the Fund’ such that the transferee 
‘should have attempted to learn more.’”89  The investor transferee need 
not have actual knowledge of some underlying fraud to be on inquiry 
notice.90 
Notwithstanding the purportedly objective nature of the good faith 
defense, the Bayou III court recognized that good faith cannot exist in a 
vacuum: “[T]o disregard objective evidence of the transferee’s subjective 
good faith intent would fundamentally distort the concept of good 
faith.”91  The court identified several factors that would negate a finding 
of good faith for purposes of section 548, which merge elements of 
inquiry notice and diligence.  Those factors include whether: (1) the 
transferee knew the fraudulent purpose of the transfer; (2) there was 
underlying fraud; (3) the transferor had an unfavorable financial 
condition or was insolvent; (4) the nature of the transfer was improper; or 
(5) the transfer was voidable.92  In essence, as a matter of law, the 
transferee bears the burden of establishing that he or she was not on 
inquiry notice.93 
Despite the societal tendency to label Ponzi scheme investors 
“victims,” courts have been reluctant to construe the inquiry notice prong 
broadly in a manner that parallels the concept of strict liability in tort 
law.94  Once the inquiry notice prong is satisfied, a transferee’s failure to 
conduct a “diligent investigation” negates the good faith defense.  In 
other words, an investor on inquiry notice must mitigate presumptive 
notice by performing a thorough investigation.95  Simply ignoring the 
warning signs defeats the good faith defense.96 
Moreover, the “diligent investigation” prong of section 548(c) 
cannot be met simply by speaking with the Ponzi operator.97  After all, 
those individuals have a tremendous incentive to obscure truth, and, in 
some cases, have perfected the art of placating investors.  Bayou III held 
that an “inconclusive diligent investigation” that failed to uncover the 
 89 Id. at 845 (quoting In re Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 23). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 849. 
 92 Id. at 845-46. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See Jobin v. McKay (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.), 84 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (10th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the presence of any circumstance placing the transferee on inquiry notice with 
respect to the financial condition of the transferor may be a contributing factor in depriving the 
transferee of the good faith defense) (internal citation omitted). 
 95 In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 369 B.R. at 846. 
 96 Id. at 847. 
 97 Id. 
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fraud will not, on its own, prove good faith.98  The investor must 
demonstrate that the reason he withdrew funds was “not because he had 
some information that there was some infirmity in the fund, but because 
of some other reason personal to him and extraneous to the well-being of 
the fund and its remaining investors.”99  In summary, in order to pass the 
Bayou III good faith hurdle, a Ponzi investor would need to show the 
following two items.  First, an investor must establish that she made a 
diligent inquiry, the results of which signaled the “all clear.”  Second, 
she has to show that the withdrawal was the product of some extraneous 
purpose wholly unrelated to red flags.100 
As to the second item, Bayou III listed specific examples of 
extraneous circumstances that would tend to demonstrate a good faith 
purpose for withdrawing funds (which would permit an investor to retain 
her principal investment while nevertheless returning any fictitious 
profits):101 (1) a pension plan liquidating its Bayou investment (along 
with other investments) to comply with ERISA; (2) a trust withdrawing 
funds for the sole purpose of funding a home purchase; (3) a partnership 
requesting a redemption as part of a liquidation of assets in advance of a 
partner’s death; (4) a parent withdrawing funds to cover expenses of a 
newborn child and private school tuition expenses; (5) Bayou returning 
an investment and closing an account after an investor’s balance fell 
below the minimum levels accepted by Bayou; and (6) a fund seeking a 
partial satisfaction of its Bayou investment to fulfill withdrawal requests 
from its own investors and to pay a bank loan.102 
Bayou III’s diligence and objectivity requirements perhaps went 
farther than other courts in denying the good faith defense.103  But Bayou 
III also provided an arbitrary set of exceptions, which seem to drift back 
toward subjective motivations for withdrawing funds.  For example, 
using withdrawals to fund the purchase of a home or the birth of a child 
may be laudable, if not sympathetic, reasons.  But the court also 
 98 Id. at 851. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 850. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 853. 
 103 Some courts have, however, strayed in that direction.  See Smith v. Suarez (In re IFS Fin. 
Corp.), 417 B.R. 419, 427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that defendants were not good faith 
transferees where evidence indicated that they knew or should have known of the illegitimacy of the 
investments and that board member acted as siblings’ “agent” such that, under agency law, his 
knowledge of fraud was imputed to the principal); see also Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16, Wing v. Nathenson, No. 2:09-cv-109-DB 
(D. Utah Sept. 4, 2009), 2009 WL 5129177 (arguing that the transferee must undertake a diligent 
investigation when put on inquiry notice of suspicious circumstances). 
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permitted a feeder fund to pay off its own bank loan.  The court initially 
defined something arguably close to strict liability in Ponzi scheme 
redemptions, but then whipsawed, carving out exceptions for a select few 
types of withdrawals.  While the court’s gesture was an attempt to soften 
the hardship of losing money by inserting a scintilla of fairness, it still 
resulted in disparate treatment.  The judgment merely realigned the 
“haves” and the “have-nots.” 
Several articles have harshly criticized Bayou III for placing 
restrictions on the good faith defense’s applicability in Ponzi schemes.104  
Notably, commentators object to what they perceive as Bayou III’s 
wholesale rejection of “decades of tradition interpreting fraudulent 
transfer law since its inception in the Statute of Elizabeth”105 and laying 
the foundation for eliminating the good faith defense under section 
548(c).  Critics argue that the Bayou III configuration of the good faith 
defense causes investors to lose the defense if they fail to ask the right 
questions.  But that is perhaps the best result, and one that unifies 
investors instead of creating factions.  Indeed, a healthy dose of 
Schadenfreude106 calms the maddening crowd by spreading shared blame 
and shared pain among all.  Nor should the good faith defense be limited 
because of burden on the courts, which would have to adjudicate the 
massive amount of claw back actions.  The good faith defense’s 
elimination is fortified by the fact that it will achieve equity among all 
creditors.107 
Regardless, Bayou III’s influence on the good faith defense would 
be short-lived.  The jilted investors appealed to the district court, and the 
result was Bayou IV.108  While the district court affirmed many of the 
bankruptcy court’s holdings, it categorically rejected the good faith 
analysis.109  The district court held that, when considering red flags of 
 104 For an example of that critique, see Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers: 
The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded and the Diligent Are Punished, 28-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 
(2009) (critiquing Bayou III’s treatment of the good faith defense); see also Kathy L. Yeatter, 
Investors Beware: Bankruptcy Court Decision Takes Narrow View of “Good Faith” Under § 
548(C), 28-Feb. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 49 (2009) (arguing that the facts of Bayou III supported the 
good faith defense). 
 105 Sinclair, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers: The Unscrupulous Are Rewarded and the 
Diligent Are Punished, 28-APR AM. BANKR. INST. J. at 16. 
 106 “Schadenfreude” is where pleasure is derived from the misfortune of others.  
Schadenfreude Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
schadenfreude?view=uk (last visited May 13, 2012). 
 107 Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939) (discussing the Bankruptcy Court’s 
broad equitable powers). 
 108 Christian Bros. High Sch. v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 439 
B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 109 Id. at 316-17. 
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fraud in connection with the investor’s related conduct, courts should 
evaluate the specific circumstances of each transfer.110  Consequently, 
Bayou IV reformulated the good faith analysis as whether a transferee 
reasonably should have known of the fraudulent intent underlying the 
transfer.111 
Bayou IV also concluded that the objective reasonable investor 
standard applies to both the inquiry notice and diligent investigation 
prongs of the good faith defense.  The district court determined that the 
bankruptcy court’s analysis of “red flags” that included “some infirmity 
in Bayou or the integrity of its management,” was overly broad and 
untenable.112  Rather, it is “information suggesting insolvency or a 
fraudulent purpose in making a transfer that triggers inquiry notice.”113 
Furthermore, Bayou IV rejected the bankruptcy court’s 
interpretation of the good faith defense’s diligent investigation prong.114  
The district court concluded that the good faith defense could not be 
forced into a strict box of requiring the investor to prove that she 
withdrew funds for a purpose unrelated to any red flags of fraud.115  
Insisting on such rigidity, according to the district court, ignores the good 
faith defense’s historical objectivity and would force judges to measure 
the transferee’s subjective motivations and intentions.116  Instead, the 
district court ruled that if “the transferee can meet its burden of 
demonstrating that a diligent investigation would not have led to 
discovery of the fraud, it may prevail on [the diligent investigation 
prong],” and defeat the specter of inquiry notice.117 
Despite the district court’s more generous construction of the good 
faith defense, the defendant-funds still lost when the issue proceeded to 
 110 Id. at 313. 
 111 Id. at 311. 
 112 Id. at 314 (quoting Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re 
Bayou Grp., LLC), 396 B.R. 810, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 
284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 315-17. 
 115 Id. at 317. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id.  There are other defenses available in fraudulent transfer actions aside from the good 
faith defense embodied in section 548(c), including the in pari delicto doctrine, which is the 
common law notion that “a plaintiff may not assert a claim against a defendant if the plaintiff bears 
fault for the claim.”  Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 390 B.R. 64, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (internal citation omitted).  Growing in its success rate, it and any other defenses outside of 
good faith are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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trial.118  The jury found that the funds failed to make the required 
investigation, and the court ordered the funds to return the entire amount 
paid to them.119 
The scope of the good faith defense, however, remains unsettled as 
the Southern District of New York continues to consider its application 
in Ponzi schemes.  In a case that expands the defense to its widest berth 
yet, Picard v. Katz,120 a Madoff by-product, the district court staunchly 
rejected the objective, or inquiry notice, approach, at least in the context 
of a Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) trusteeship.121  The 
court noted that, in cases involving bankrupt securities firms, bankruptcy 
law incorporates certain elements of securities law.122  Consequently, the 
court concluded that the “safe harbor” provision of section 546(e) barred 
the SIPA trustee, Irving Picard, from pursuing any claims based upon 
either preference law or constructive fraud.123 
The trustee was left only with the actual fraud claims under section 
548(a)(1)(A), which the court then narrowly construed.124  With respect 
to intent, the court held, where a SIPA trustee was involved, the trustee 
must meet the level of scienter required in a securities fraud case: “proof 
of more than negligent nonfeasance.”125  Focusing on the plain language 
of the Bankruptcy Code, the court rejected Picard’s argument that 
applying the safe harbor ran counter to the legislative goals.126  The court 
also concluded that the aims of the legislation would be served because 
the recovery actions in the Madoff case threatened the sort of market 
upheaval SIPA was designed to avoid.127 
Addressing the good faith defense, the court reasoned that although 
securities law will not protect an investor from “willful blindness” to 
obvious fraud, “[a] securities investor has no inherent duty to inquire 
 118 Joel Rosenblatt, Bayou Group Estate Wins $13 Million from Hedge Funds for Fraud 
Investors, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2011, 9:08 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-13/bayou-
group-estate-wins-13-million-from-hedge-funds-for-fraud-investors.html. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Picard v. Katz, No. 11 Civ. 3605 (JSR), 2011 WL 4448638, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2011). 
 121 Id. at *5.  When a brokerage firm fails, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
(“SIPC”) transfers the failed brokerage’s accounts to a different securities brokerage firm.  If the 
SIPC is unable to arrange the accounts’ transfer, the failed firm is liquidated.  See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
78aaa et seq. (Westlaw 2012) (detailing the procedure by which SIPC winds up a failed brokerage).  
In the Madoff case, the liquidation began under SIPA and flowed into the bankruptcy court. 
 122 Katz, 2011 WL 4448638, at *2. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at *1. 
 125 Id. at *5 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976)). 
 126 Id. at *2–3. 
 127 Id. at *3. 
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about his stockbroker, and SIPA creates no such duty.”128  According to 
the court’s formulation, the good faith defense remains available even if 
an investor encounters “suspicious circumstances” but fails to investigate 
further.129  Nonetheless, the case ultimately settled with Picard bringing 
in more than $160 million in the Katz case.130 
Katz directly conflicted with another Southern District of New York 
opinion in the Madoff case, Picard v. Merkin,131 decided only a month 
earlier.  In Merkin, the district court ruled that the complaint—which 
alleged fraudulent transfers based on both actual and constructive 
fraud—could survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  In contrast to 
Judge Rakoff (in Katz), Judge Wood (in Merkin) determined that both 
the Bankruptcy Code and New York state fraudulent transfer law focus 
squarely on the intent of the debtor-transferor and not the intent of the 
transferee.132  The court concluded that the consideration of the section 
546(e) safe harbor defense was premature, as the court had not yet 
crossed that bridge. 
Given two wildly different interpretations of the good faith defense 
within the confines of the same case, the only thing that is clear is the 
unpredictability and inconsistency of the application of the good faith 
defense.  A litigant attempting to ascertain the legal landscape of the 
good faith defense in Ponzi schemes would be no worse off if she flipped 
a coin. 
What is clear is that the actual fraud theory may be used to recover 
the entire amount paid to the investor, whereas constructive fraud may be 
unable to reach some, or all, of a victim’s principal investment.  Where a 
transfer is avoided as a constructive fraud, the trustee’s recovery is 
limited to the profits the investor received over and above the principal 
investment,133 unless the trustee proves that the innocent investor lacked 
 128 Id. at *5. 
 129 Id. at *6. 
 130 Richard Sandomir & Ken Belson, Mets’ Owners Agree to Settle Madoff Suit for $162 
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/sports/ 
baseball/mets-owners-pay-162-million-to-settle-madoff-suit.html?pagewanted=all. 
 131 Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 MC 0012(KMW), 
2011 WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011). 
 132 Id. at *8-13.  Under New York state law, however, the transferee’s intent (or lack thereof) 
can be considered an affirmative defense. 
 133 See Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 483 (D. Conn. 2002) 
(discussing the trustee’s attempt to recover interest payments under a constructive fraud theory); 11 
U.S.C.A. § 548(c) (Westlaw 2012); see also Kapila v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Pearlman), 440 B.R. 
900, 905-06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010) (stating an affirmative “good faith” defense is available to 
individuals in actual fraud cases); Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision Entm’t, Inc.), 275 
B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“All recipients of avoidable transfers from a debtor 
operating a Ponzi scheme are entitled to raise good faith as a defense.”). 
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good faith, in which case the trustee may use constructive fraud to 
recover the investor’s principal.134  The law of preferences contains no 
corresponding good faith caveat.135 
3.  Calculating “Value” into the Good Faith Equation of Section 
548(c) 
The two most recent Madoff cases discussed in the preceding 
section examined the “good faith” prong of section 548(c) without 
touching upon the “for value” component of the defense, the application 
of which itself remains unclear in Ponzi cases.  This is perhaps due to the 
fact that “value” is defined in section 548(d).  Value was an issue in one 
Ponzi scheme case where the bankruptcy court considered whether 
equity-denominated investments (as opposed to the more traditional debt 
investments) that were repaid qualified as “value” for purposes of the 
section 548(c) defense.  In re International Management Associates, LLC 
(“IMA”)136 illustrates the different notions and interplay of defenses in 
fraudulent transfer actions in Ponzi schemes.  Given the lack of authority 
on “for value” in the context of equity investments, IMA would later be 
catapulted to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by route of the rarely 
used direct appeal.137 
Recall that a transferee is entitled to keep the transfer if she can 
prove that she acted in “good faith” and that she provided the transferor 
“value” in exchange for the transfer.138  To limit its focus to the “value” 
question, the court assumed that that trustee had established his prima 
facie avoidance case under federal and state law.139 
By the language of section 548(c), the typical fraudulent transfer 
defendant can establish an affirmative defense to a trustee’s avoidance 
 134 See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under the constructive 
fraud theory, the receiver may only recover ‘profits’ above the initial outlay, unless the receiver can 
prove a lack of good faith, in which case the receiver may also recover the amounts that could be 
considered return of principal.”). 
 135 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (Westlaw 2012) (allowing recovery of any transfer that provided 
the transferee with more than he would have recovered otherwise). 
 136 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6506657 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. Dec. 1, 2009), aff’d, 661 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 137 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6498191 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. Dec. 1, 2009) (order certifying case for direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 138 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(c) (Westlaw 2012). 
 139 The relevant facts included: (a) that the investor defendant tendered an essentially 
worthless equity interest to the debtor in exchange for the transfer; and (b) that the investor 
defendant held an unasserted claim against the debtor that arose at the time the investor defendant 
originally invested as an equity holder in the debtor.  In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 2009 WL 
6506657, at *8-9. 
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action by showing that it provided “value” in exchange for any transfer 
received from the debtor.  The “value” inquiry exists independently of 
the question of “good faith.”140  In Ponzi schemes, however, investor 
defendants are not typical defendants.  The transfer is made on account 
of the investor defendant’s equity interest, an interest that arguably never 
had any value (contrasted to a debt investment, where the principal 
investment does constitute value).  Consequently, the availability of the 
section 548(c) defense is in doubt in Ponzi schemes because any 
cognizable value disappears to the inescapable bottom of a black hole.  
The bankruptcy court in IMA correctly questioned whether an exchange 
for value with respect to an equity interest is ever possible in a Ponzi 
scheme.141  In IMA, the court adopted the well-established money-in, 
money-out principle that a “defrauded Ponzi scheme investor has a claim 
for the return of its principal investment based on fraud and that the 
satisfaction of this fraud claim through transfers, at least up to the 
amount of principal, constitutes ‘value’ for purposes of the defense to a 
fraudulent transfer claim under Section 548(c) and equivalent state 
laws.”142  But the trustee sought an exception to the general rule when 
the victim’s principal investment is in the form of equity.  The trustee 
argued that, in a Ponzi scheme, a transfer on account of an equity interest 
cannot be an exchange for value: the distinction between IMA and the 
“run of the mill” Ponzi rests in the equity nature of the fraudulent 
investments that the debtors offered in their capital con
ture.143 
The trustee’s argument has some attractive features, especially its 
promotion of the equality of distribution.  Ponzi victims would be placed 
in a one-size-fits-all box without regard to the strategic positioning of 
who got what out and when.  The bankruptcy court found the trustee’s 
foothold persuasive but not authoritative.  Ultimately, the court had to 
decide between equal application (principal Ponzi payments constitute 
 140 See id. at *8 (stating that an adverse ruling on trustee’s motion for partial summary 
judgment, seeking a ruling “that, as a matter of law, an investor who made an equity investment in 
the debtors and received payments did not receive the payments ‘for value,’” did not “fully negate 
the Trustee’s ability to defeat the [section 548(c)] defense, because the defense also requires that the 
transfer be in ‘good faith’”). 
 141 See id. at *9 (acknowledging the trustee’s argument that the general rule “that the victim of 
a Ponzi scheme has a claim for the return of the principal it invested based on fraud and that 
payments up to the amount of the invested principal are made in exchange for ‘value’” does not 
apply in situations where the “victim’s investment takes the form of an equity investment,” but 
concluding “that interpretation of the fraudulent transfer laws has made no distinction based on the 
form of the investment.”). 
 142 Id. at *10. 
 143 Id. at *9. 
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nly United States Court of Appeals that had 
discu
elieved that every investor 
shou
 
value) and equal distribution (Ponzi equity participation and debt receive 
identical treatment) under the law.144  The court held that the former rule 
prevailed, and that the investors received “value” to the extent of the 
invested principal.145  Although the court noted the fairness of an 
alternate rule favoring equal distribution regardless of whether the 
investments took the form of debt or equity,146 the court found no 
authority to support such a rule.  Rather, the bankruptcy court in IMA 
followed the lead of the o
ssed the question.147 
Nevertheless, given the importance of the issue and the glut of 
Ponzi scheme cases in the United States,148 the bankruptcy court certified 
the question for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit.149  The bankruptcy court justified the direct appeal 
by suggesting that numerous judges, trustees, receivers, and parties need 
guidance and a definitive rule,150 that current law requires court to fall 
back on a general default rule established for debt investments to 
conclude that “investors who held equity interests in the fraudulent 
scheme from the outset could assert the ‘value’ defense,”151 and that it 
would be useful for the court of appeals to establish the rules of play for 
equity interests in Ponzi schemes.152  Whether the equity holders 
constitute a special team, the IMA court b
ld get equal play time and distributions. 
In IMA, the parties fundamentally disagreed whether equity interests 
should be analyzed differently than debt-based claims.153  The Eleventh 
Circuit ultimately affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision that equity 
and debt-based claims in Ponzi schemes are on par with one another.154  
Given the specificity of the issue as it pertains to equity claims, the court 
punted on whether section 548(c) should be available to the universe of 
 144 “[T]he Court concludes that no principled basis exists for a different result depending on 
the technical form of the fraudulent investment.”  Id. at *10. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at *9. 
 147 See Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing “reasonably equivalent value”). 
 148 Id. at *3. 
 149 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at *1 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6506657, at *9-10 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009), aff’d, 661 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 154 Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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 for the manner in which a Ponzi fraudster 
perp
r inconsistent results, delayed adjudication, and 
skyro
, lucky and/or aggressive creditors—recover 
at lea
faith,” or were they relying on promises that were, in essence, “too good 
 
Ponzi scheme investment clawbacks, irrespective of equity or debt status.  
Given the expanding universe of Ponzi schemes and defrauded investors, 
the “value” component is as much a recurring issue as good faith.155  
Under IMA, substance governs over the transaction’s form to permit 
Ponzi victims to retain payment of and submit claims for funds up to the 
amount of the principal investment,156 such that fraudulent transfer law 
reallocates losses equally among all Ponzi victims.  Notions of equity 
and fairness may, counter-intuitively, dictate disparate treatment for 
equity investments.  An equally compelling argument is that investors 
should not be penalized
etrated the scheme. 
Either way, the general rule—that the repayment of principal 
constitutes value in exchange for the transfer irrespective of whether the 
investment was debt or equity—may be running into overtime.  Judicial 
discontent from Bayou to IMA has generated some congressional 
conversations about rulemaking in Ponzi cases.  Currently, given the 
number of jurisdictions and the growth in the Ponzi scheme largesse, 
there is a “potential fo
cketing costs.”157 
The demolition of the good faith defense for investors in cash-in, 
cash-out Ponzi schemes (where “debts were incurred as part of an 
extraordinary and unlawful enterprise and payments came from other 
people’s money”)158 leaves a sour taste in the mouth.  Yet, to implement 
a primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., equality of the 
distribution), it is a necessary evil that ensures that all creditors—not just 
the most friendly, necessary
st part of their claims. 
In determining the good faith of “innocent” investor-victims, the 
key practical question is often: were the investors expecting a 
commercially reasonable rate of return, for “equivalent value and good 
 155 See, e.g., Karen E. Nelson, Note, Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme Avoidance 
Law and the Inequity of Clawbacks, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1456, 1480-89 (2011) (arguing that courts 
should expand the definition of value to account for both the time value and opportunity costs of 
withdrawals in order to arrive at a more equitable solution for winning investors). 
 156 In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 2009 WL 6506657, at *10; see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 
295, 305 (1939) (noting that bankruptcy courts “have been invoked to the end that fraud will not 
prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent 
substantial justice from being done”). 
 157 Tally M. Weiner, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Proceeding, 15 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221, 236 (2009) (discussing clawbacks, preferences, and fraudulent transfers in 
the Madoff Ponzi scheme). 
 158 Id. at 224. 
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to be true”?159  In In re Carrozzella & Richardson, a Connecticut district 
court found that guaranteed 15% interest payments were reasonable and 
treated the payments as favorably as any other trade creditor, like the 
utility company.160  An Ohio bankruptcy court, however, found returns 
of 12% to 24% to be an unreasonable rate of return in the context of a 
Ponzi scheme.161  This split between the courts perpetuates inconsistency 
and unpredictability.  For some investors, section 548(c) provides a total 
shield from a clawback action, but for others the defense is more of a 
brass ring hanging just out of reach. 
On another aspect of investor responsibility, analogous to good 
faith, some courts assign different levels of responsibility depending on 
the role the investor plays in the overall scheme.162  Sometimes, courts 
justify clawbacks in part by viewing typical investors as partially 
responsible for perpetuating a Ponzi fraud.163  Courts raise the bar of 
responsibility even higher for brokers that feed hungry investors into 
Ponzi schemes.  While brokers may be unknowing co-conspirators, they 
do earn commissions for placing customers with the fraudulent funds.  
The commissions they receive from Ponzi funds are subject to avoidance 
actions, and some courts reject a good faith defense as applied to 
commissions earned by steering investors to Ponzi funds.164  In World 
Vision, not only did the court reject the brokers’ good faith defense, but it 
also deemed their actions of soliciting new investors, which perpetuated 
the illegal Ponzi scheme, to be fraudulent.165 
As IMA, World Vision, Bayou III, and Bayou IV demonstrate, the 
applicability and even definition of good faith is in flux.  Additionally, 
the iterations of good faith from these cases fail to address the reality that 
early investors benefit from the misfortunes of subsequent investors.  
Holding fast to the antediluvian concepts of good faith effectively hardly 
approaches a solution.  The status quo contributes to drawn-out litigation 
 159 Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 286 B.R. 480, 491 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 160 Id. at 483-84, 484 n.7, 490-91. 
 161 See In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 972, 985-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that the 
investors did not give reasonably equivalent value). 
 162 See, e.g., In re Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, No. A06-62966-PWB, 2009 WL 6498191, at 
*3-4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009) (discussing the potential different levels of responsibility of 
debt and equity investors). 
 163 E.g., In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 488 (“Further, by helping the debtor 
perpetuate his illegal scheme, the transfers between the debtor and investors only exacerbated the 
harm to the debtor’s creditors by increasing the amount of claims, while diminishing the debtor’s 
estate.”). 
 164 See Cuthill v. Greenmark, LLC (In re World Vision Entm’t, Inc.), 275 B.R. 641, 658-61 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting such a defense). 
 165 Id. at 657. 
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over the standards, customs, practices, sophistication, and experience 
generally possessed by the individual investors—and that is just to 
establish inquiry notice.  Once the investor is on inquiry notice, there is 
still another layer of litigation remaining that considers whether a 
“diligent investigation” would have discovered the fraudulent purpose of 
the transfer.  The Bayou good faith litigation boiled down to a question 
over the investors’ knowledge or suspicions about “some potential 
infirmity” that would trigger an investigation into their investment.166  
But questioning what a “reasonably prudent institutional hedge fund 
investor” would do diminishes an already starved estate.  In contrast, 
eliminating the good faith defense focuses on the real problem of 
maximizing those assets for the benefit of all investors.  The Madoff case 
typifies how the bacteria of good faith can infect even the fundamental 
chore of calculating loss. 
III.  CRIMINAL FORFEITURE AND BANKRUPTCY AVOIDANCE ACTIONS 
The differences between the Bankruptcy Code and federal forfeiture 
schemes are most clearly observed when civil or criminal forfeiture 
actions are initiated against property that is in the debtor’s estate, or 
when involuntary bankruptcy is filed after the forfeitures have been 
filed.167  If the conflicting interests—criminal and bankruptcy—can 
create an arrangement that effectively segregates property, then the 
problem would be an easy one.  Unfortunately, in many cases, early 
diplomatic negotiations are the exception and not the rule. 
The first problem for the bankruptcy trustee in these cases is one of 
timing.  After the government has seized property, the time limit for the 
bankruptcy trustee to file avoidance actions will likely run out while the 
trustee is waiting for his claims to the forfeited property to be heard.168 
The second problem is one of proof.  Once assets of the estate are 
seized in forfeiture, the trustee must try to challenge the forfeiture openly 
or in an ancillary proceeding.  Because the trustee is a bona fide 
purchaser for value, he will likely be successful in an ancillary 
 166 Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 
396 B.R. 810, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 167 United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR, 2010 WL 4064809, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
14, 2010) (noting that the trustee showed the accounts belonged to RRA (not defendant) but that 
government argues that third party cannot have superior claim to proceeds of fraud). 
 168 See United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Those payments could 
have been reclaimed under the trustee’s avoiding powers and made available to all of the bilked 
investors.”). 
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proceeding.  But if other parties have an interest in the property, it 
remains the province of the judge to decide who receives the property; 
hence, the difficulties the trustee faces in amassing the estate.169 
The trustee’s action is structured to stop the “run on the bank” 
mentality of creditors, and to put them in an orderly line.  While the 
forfeiture statutes do provide a resource for restitution, they do not 
delineate a broad system for gathering and distributing those assets 
among the victims.170  Also, because only small subsets of victims file 
third party claims against forfeited property, there is high potential for 
inequitable results. 
To further complicate matters, the distinction between civil and 
criminal forfeiture seems to be not well defined in Ponzi scheme cases.  
Because of expansion and modification of forfeiture powers under the 
amendments passed in 2000, and the fact that civil forfeiture need not 
await conviction, the government typically includes a civil forfeiture 
allegation in a criminal indictment.  In many cases the government will 
seize property from many persons, commence a civil forfeiture 
proceeding, file a criminal indictment, name the property in the 
indictment, and subsequently abandon the civil forfeiture actions.171  The 
forfeiture procedures found in the RICO statutes, which are often applied 
in Ponzi scheme cases, also allow for the forfeiture of items obtained 
with both legal and illegal money.172 
When the government is the one distributing the seized cash in 
Ponzi cases, conflicts may arise among “creditors” and “victims.”  The 
business used to perpetrate fraud may be quasi-legitimate with real 
 169 See generally Appellant Brief, Herbert Stettin, as Chapter 11 Trustee of Rothstein 
Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., v. United States, No. 11-10676-B (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011); see also 
Appellant Brief, Herbert Stettin, as Chapter 11 Trustee of Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A. v. United 
States, No. 11-10676-B (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2011). 
 170 Frykholm, 362 F.3d at 417. 
 171 This was the procedure in the Scott Rothstein case.  The government seized personal 
property as well as assets titled in the name of the law firm.  The court placed the burden of proof on 
the trustee to prove that the funds from the law firm were derived from a legitimate source.  This is 
pending on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.  United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR, 2010 WL 
4064809, (S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010). 
 172 See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 984 (Westlaw 2012) (relieving the government of the burden 
of tracing such criminal proceeds in certain cases, but only within a short time period).  But see 
United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (stating that once a defendant has 
commingled legitimate funds with illegitimate funds in money-laundering such that they cannot be 
divided without difficulty, the government must satisfy its forfeiture judgment through the substitute 
asset provision of 21 U.S.C. §853(p)).  This could be bothersome because under 18 U.S.C. § 
983(a)(3)(C) the government could seize an asset using civil forfeiture and put it in a criminal 
indictment and possibly prevent another party from contesting it until the issue has been resolved 
under 21 U.S.C. § 853(k). 
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clients and customers whose money was not used illegally, but they are 
still out cash.  Also, every business has to sign contracts for legitimate 
purposes such as leases, contractors, copiers, the office refrigerator, etc.  
If the government is the one doling out the cash, these legitimate 
creditors may not be entitled to file a claim as victims, and may have to 
hope for leftovers from the bankruptcy trustee when it is all over. 
In some recent cases, the judges allowed the trustee to handle the 
distribution of funds.173  Restitution and remission proceedings 
essentially mimic the bankruptcy proceedings but rest upon different 
statutory and substantive procedures than bankruptcy distribution.  Some 
judges find greater efficiency in the bankruptcy proceedings.  The 
Eleventh Circuit explained this in United States v. Shefton, when it said: 
We recognize the government argues that the Fund is not entitled to a 
constructive trust because the Fund has an adequate remedy at law 
based on the Attorney General’s authority, pursuant to § 853(i)(1), to 
remit forfeiture “in the interest of justice.”  However, § 853(i)(1) 
remission is a non-judicial remedy left entirely to the discretion of the 
Attorney General.  DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175, 
186-87 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177, 185-86 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Under Georgia law, equitable remedies, such as 
constructive trusts, are not precluded by the existence of an alternate 
remedy that is “not as complete or effectual as the equitable relief.”  
O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4.  Given that § 853(i)(1) leaves to the government, 
which holds the forfeited property, full and unreviewable discretion as 
to whether it will release some or all of it, § 853(i)(1) remission is 
certainly not as complete or effectual as the equitable relief of a 
constructive trust.  Thus, we conclude that the Fund has, under these 
facts, established an entitlement to a constructive trust on the Forfeited 
Property. 
In this case, restitution was better left to state law on constructive trusts 
rather than forfeiture proceedings.  A partnership between the 
government and bankruptcy trustee must be forged to exploit the 
strengths of both.  The government is good at identifying the fraud, 
seizing the assets, and bringing the prosecution.  One court has implied 
that bankruptcy proceedings are the more efficient means of dealing with 
 173 People with an interest in the forfeited property will most likely be creditors of the estate; 
but, it is important to note that people may receive more from the forfeiture proceeding than from the 
bankruptcy case, either through retaining the property or through restitution proceedings, hence their 
incentive to challenge bankruptcy distribution. 
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the estate,174 but these cases are not one-size-fits all, and it remains that 
forfeiture may be the better course in some cases while bankruptcy gains 
the advantage in another. 
CONCLUSION 
Forfeiture statutes are helpful for collecting assets in Ponzi schemes.  
Once fraud enters the picture, the government has the long arm of the 
law on its side and it can, almost immediately, begin to seize assets 
related to the Ponzi scheme.  But bankruptcy avoidance actions can also 
marshal and distribute property of the estate.  Both sets of rules can in 
many instances create a fair division between all creditors and victims.  
The two sides may never agree on who should win, but at least there is 
recognition between the two camps that more can be done to reconcile 
the approach of two very different systems in the same case. 
 174 Frykholm, 362 F.3d at 417 (“Neither side paid much attention to the effect of the 
fraudulent conveyance, likely because both sides are represented by forfeiture specialists and have 
focused on the language of § 853 and opinions interpreting that statute.  Everything would have been 
clearer had the United States initiated an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against Frykholm [the 
Fraudster].  That not only would have brought to the fore § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code but also 
would have provided a superior way to marshal [the fraudster’s] remaining assets and distribute 
them to her creditors.  Although § 853(n)(1) allows the Attorney General to use forfeited assets for 
restitution, it does not create a comprehensive means of collecting and distributing assets.  
Bankruptcy would have made it pellucid that Cotswold [the creditor] cannot enjoy any priority over 
the other victims and cannot reap a profit while [the fraudster’s] other creditors go begging.  
Moreover, bankruptcy would have enabled the trustee to recoup the sums distributed to the first 
generation of investors . . . . Those payments could have been reclaimed under the trustee’s avoiding 
powers and made available to all of the bilked investors.  It is too late to pursue the profits . . . , but it 
is not too late to prevent the preferential distribution of any further assets to favored investors.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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APPENDIX A 
I.  RESTORATION AND GRANTING OF REMISSION AND MITIGATION1 
(3) 
(xi) Restoration of proceeds from sale 
(A) A petition for restoration of the proceeds from the sale 
of forfeited property, or for the appraised value of forfeited 
property when the forfeited property has been retained by or 
delivered to a government agency for official use, may be 
submitted by an owner or lienholder in cases in which the 
petitioner: 
(1) Did not know of the seizure prior to the entry of a 
declaration of forfeiture; and 
 
(2) Could not reasonably have known of the seizure 
prior to the entry of a declaration of forfeiture. 
(B) Such a petition shall be submitted pursuant to 
paragraphs (j)(3)(ii) through (v) of this section within ninety 
(90) days from the date the property is sold or otherwise 
disposed of. 
(4) Petitions in judicial forfeiture cases— 
(i) Procedure for filing petition. If the forfeiture proceedings are 
judicial, a petition for remission or mitigation of a judicial 
forfeiture shall be addressed to the Attorney General; shall be 
sworn to by the petitioner or by the petitioner’s attorney upon 
information and belief, supported by the client’s sworn notice of 
representation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746; and shall be submitted 
to the United States Attorney for the district in which the judicial 
forfeiture proceedings are brought. A petitioner also shall submit 
a copy of the petition to the Chief Postal Inspector if the Postal 
Inspection Service was the seizing agency. 
(ii) Ruling. Department of Justice regulations on petitions for 
remission or mitigation in judicial forfeiture cases are stated in 29 
CFR § 9.4. 
 
 1 39 C.F.R. §§ 233.7(j)(3)(xi), (4), (5) (Westlaw 2012). 
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(5) Criteria governing administrative remission and mitigation— 
(i) Remission. 
(A) The Ruling Official shall not grant remission of a 
forfeiture unless the petitioner establishes that: 
(1) The petitioner has a valid, good faith and legally 
cognizable interest in the seized property as owner or 
lienholder as defined in these regulations; and 
 
(2) The petitioner is innocent within the meaning of the 
innocent owner provisions of the applicable civil 
forfeiture statute, is a bona fide purchaser for value 
without cause to believe that the property was subject 
to forfeiture at the time of the purchase, or is one who 
held a legally cognizable interest in the seized property 
at the time of the violation underlying the forfeiture 
superior to that of the defendant within the meaning of 
the applicable criminal forfeiture statute, and is thereby 
entitled to recover his or her interest in the forfeited 
property by statute.  (If the applicable civil forfeiture 
statute contains no innocent owner defense, the 
innocent owner provisions applicable to 21 U.S.C. 
881(a)(4) shall apply.)  Unless otherwise provided by 
statute, in the case of petitioners who acquired their 
interest in the property after the time of the violation 
underlying the forfeiture, the question of whether the 
petitioner had knowledge of the violation shall be 
determined as of the point in time when the interest in 
the property was acquired. 
(B) The knowledge and responsibilities of petitioner’s 
representative, agent, or employee in paragraph 
(j)(5)(i)(A)(2) of this section are imputed to the petitioner 
where the representative, agent, or employee was acting in 
the course of his or her employment and in furtherance of 
the petitioner’s business. 
 
(C) The petitioner has the burden of establishing the basis 
for granting a petition for remission or mitigation of 
forfeited property, a restoration of proceeds of sale or 
appraised value of forfeited property, or a reconsideration of 
a denial of such a petition.  Failure to provide information or 
documents and to submit to interviews, as requested, may 
result in a denial of the petition. 
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(D) The Ruling Official shall presume a valid forfeiture and 
shall not consider whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the forfeiture. 
 
(E) Willful, materially false statements or information, made 
or furnished by the petitioner in support of a petition for 
remission or mitigation of forfeited property, the restoration 
of proceeds or appraised value of forfeited property, or the 
reconsideration of a denial of any such petition, shall be 
grounds for denial of such petition and possible prosecution 
for the filing of false statements. 
(ii) Mitigation. 
(A) The Ruling Official may grant mitigation to a party not 
involved in the commission of the offense underlying 
forfeiture: 
(1) Where the petitioner has not met the minimum 
conditions for remission, but the Ruling Official finds 
that some relief should be granted to avoid extreme 
hardship and that return of the property combined with 
imposition of monetary and/or other conditions of 
mitigation in lieu of a complete forfeiture will promote 
the interest of justice and will not diminish the 
deterrent effect of the law.  Extenuating circumstances 
justifying such a finding include those circumstances 
that reduce the responsibility of the petitioner for 
knowledge of the illegal activity, knowledge of the 
criminal record of a user of the property, or failure to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use or 
acquisition by another for some reason, such as a 
reasonable fear of reprisal; or 
 
(2) Where the minimum standards for remission have 
been satisfied but the overall circumstances are such 
that, in the opinion of the Ruling Official, complete 
relief is not warranted. 
(B) The Ruling Official may in his or her discretion grant 
mitigation to a party involved in the commission of the 
offense underlying the forfeiture where certain mitigating 
factors exist, including, but not limited to: The lack of a 
prior record or evidence of similar criminal conduct; if the 
violation does not include drug distribution, manufacturing, 
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or importation, the fact that the violator has taken steps, such 
as drug treatment, to prevent further criminal conduct; the 
fact that the violation was minimal and was not part of a 
larger criminal scheme; the fact that the violator has 
cooperated with federal, state, or local investigations 
relating to the criminal conduct underlying the forfeiture; or 
the fact that complete forfeiture of an asset is not necessary 
to achieve the legitimate purposes of forfeiture. 
 
(C) Mitigation may take the form of a monetary condition or 
the imposition of other conditions relating to the continued 
use of the property, and the return of the property, in 
addition to the imposition of any other costs that would be 
chargeable as a condition to remission.  This monetary 
condition is considered as an item of cost payable by the 
petitioner, and shall be deposited into the Postal Service 
Fund as an amount realized from forfeiture in accordance 
with the applicable statute.  If the petitioner fails to accept 
the Ruling Official’s mitigation decision or any of its 
conditions, or fails to pay the monetary amount within 
twenty (20) days of the receipt of the decision, the property 
shall be sold, and the monetary amount imposed and other 
costs chargeable as a condition to mitigation shall be 
subtracted from the proceeds of the sale before transmitting 
the remainder to the petitioner. 
II.   FORFEITURE PROCESS 
(A) The steps of forfeiture are: 
(1) Seizure2 
(2) Notice3 
(3) Forfeiture Proceeding4 
(4) Recovery5 
 2 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (b)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2012). 
 3 See also 39 C.F.R. § 233.7 (Westlaw 2012). 
 4 See Criminal and Civil forfeiture proceedings supra. 
 5 See Infra Appendix A.III. 
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III.  ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS6 
(c) Ancillary Proceeding; Entering a Final Order of Forfeiture 
(1) In General. If, as prescribed by statute, a third party files a 
petition asserting an interest in the property to be forfeited, the 
court must conduct an ancillary proceeding, but no ancillary 
proceeding is required to the extent that the forfeiture consists of 
a money judgment. 
(A) In the ancillary proceeding, the court may, on motion, 
dismiss the petition for lack of standing, for failure to state a 
claim, or for any other lawful reason.  For purposes of the 
motion, the facts set forth in the petition are assumed to be 
true. 
 
(B) After disposing of any motion filed under Rule 
32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the 
petition, the court may permit the parties to conduct 
discovery in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure if the court determines that discovery is necessary 
or desirable to resolve factual issues.  When discovery ends, 
a party may move for summary judgment under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
(2) Entering a Final Order. When the ancillary proceeding 
ends, the court must enter a final order of forfeiture by amending 
the preliminary order as necessary to account for any third-party 
rights.  If no third party files a timely petition, the preliminary 
order becomes the final order of forfeiture if the court finds that 
the defendant (or any combination of defendants convicted in the 
case) had an interest in the property that is forfeitable under the 
applicable statute.  The defendant may not object to the entry of 
the final order on the ground that the property belongs, in whole 
 6 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c).  The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 32.2. states that as soon 
as practicable after a verdict or finding of guilty “the court must determine what property is subject 
to forfeiture under the applicable statute.”  This is known as the preliminary order of forfeiture.  The 
preliminary order of forfeiture is a prerequisite to the commencement of the ancillary hearings where 
the third party rights are adjudicated.  The preliminary order of forfeiture becomes a final order if no 
party brings a successful ancillary challenge.  The purpose of the ancillary proceeding is to prevent 
“the inadvertent forfeiture of property in which the defendant had no interest.” See United States v. 
Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 347 (2009) (citing a statement 
in United States v. Elmes, 532 F.3d 1138, 1144 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008) that “[a]lthough not binding, the 
interpretations in the Advisory Committee Notes are nearly universally accorded great weight in 
interpreting federal rules.”). 
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or in part, to a codefendant or third party; nor may a third party 
object to the final order on the ground that the third party had an 
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APPENDIX B 
I.  FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS AND OBLIGATIONS7 
(a) 
(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to 
or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of 
an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including 
any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an 
employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or 
incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily— 
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which 
the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such 
transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; 
or 
 
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was 
made or such obligation was incurred, or became 
insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; 
 
(ii)(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was 
about to engage in business or a transaction, for which 
any property remaining with the debtor was an 
unreasonably small capital; 
 
(ii)(III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor 
would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor’s 
ability to pay as such debts matured; or 
 
(ii)(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an 
insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit 
of an insider, under an employment contract and not in 
the ordinary course of business. 
 
 7 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (Westlaw 2012). 
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(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious 
or charitable entity or organization shall not be considered to be a 
transfer covered under paragraph (1)(B) in any case in which— 
(A) the amount of that contribution does not exceed 15 
percent of the gross annual Income of the debtor for the year 
in which the transfer of the contribution is made; or 
 
(B) the contribution made by a debtor exceeded the 
percentage amount of gross annual income specified in 
subparagraph (A), if the transfer was consistent with the 
practices of the debtor in making charitable contributions. 
(b) The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date 
of the filing of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the 
debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such 
transfer or obligation. 
 
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this 
section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a 
transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for 
value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest 
transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may 
be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the 
debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation. 
 
(d) 
(1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such 
transfer is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor 
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be 
perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property transferred 
that is superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, 
but if such transfer is not so perfected before the commencement 
of the case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of 





(2) In this section— 
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(A) “value” means property, or satisfaction or securing of a 
present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not 
include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the 
debtor or to a relative of the debtor; 
 
(B) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, 
stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or 
securities clearing agency that receives a margin payment, 
as defined in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or 
settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this 
title, takes for value to the extent of such payment; 
 
(C) a repo participant or financial participant that receives a 
margin payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 of this 
title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741 of this 
title, in connection with a repurchase agreement, takes for 
value to the extent of such payment; 
 
(D) a swap participant or financial participant that receives a 
transfer in connection with a swap agreement takes for value 
to the extent of such transfer; and 
 
(E) a master netting agreement participant that receives a 
transfer in connection with a master netting agreement or 
any individual contract covered thereby takes for value to 
the extent of such transfer, except that, with respect to a 
transfer under any individual contract covered thereby, to 
the extent that such master netting agreement participant 
otherwise did not take (or is otherwise not deemed to have 
taken) such transfer for value. 
(3) In this section, the term “charitable contribution” means a 
charitable contribution, as that term is defined in section 170(c) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution— 







(B) consists of— 
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(i) a financial instrument (as that term is defined in 




(4) In this section, the term “qualified religious or charitable 
entity or organization” means— 
(A) an entity described in section 170(c)(1) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986; or 
 
(B) an entity or organization described in section 170(c)(2) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
(e) 
(1) In addition to any transfer that the trustee may otherwise 
avoid, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property that was made on or within 10 years before the 
date of the filing of the petition, if— 
(A) such transfer was made to a self-settled trust or similar 
device; 
 
(B) such transfer was by the debtor; 
 
(C) the debtor is a beneficiary of such trust or similar 
device; and 
 
(D) the debtor made such transfer with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was 
or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made, 
indebted. 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, a transfer includes a 
transfer made in anticipation of any money judgment, settlement, 
civil penalty, equitable order, or criminal fine incurred by, or 
which the debtor believed would be incurred by— 
(A) any violation of the securities laws (as defined in section 
3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(47))), any State securities laws, or any regulation or 
order issued under Federal securities laws or State securities 
laws; or 
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(B) fraud, deceit, or manipulation in a fiduciary capacity or 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered under section 12 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78o(d)) or under 
section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77f). 
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